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The central claims of Hobbes's Leviathan are well known. Humans, to 
fulfill their desires, including a primary desire for self-preservation, 
attempt to secure and wield as much power as possible. Since all possess 
by nature the liberty to use power as they see fit, and since all are roughly 
equal in strength of mind and body, it can be expected that there will be 
competition for power, which will cause quarrels, diffidence, and vain glory. 
The combination of these transforms the state of nature into the state of 
war where life is nasty, brutish and short. Since the root cause of the war of 
all against all is the natural liberty of each to use power as s/he sees fit, 
reason suggests that individuals contract with one another to surrender 
this liberty to an absolute sovereign. 
Traditionally, two questions have been asked of Hobbes's argument. 
First, if humans are rational, why do they not see the benefits of 
cooperation, temper their actions and so avoid the war of all against all? 
Second, if humans are not able to cooperate with one another without the 
presence of an absolute sovereign, how can they ever hope to contract with 
one another to institute an absolute sovereign? Jean Hampton in her 
Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition attempts to give a reading of 
Hobbes that answers these two important questions. While I do not think 
Hampton's reading of Hobbes avoids the problems latent in the two 
questions posed above, I do believe that she offers the strongest 
presentation of Hobbes's argument to date; it will therefore be instructive 
to determine exactly where her attempt encounters difficulties. 
Hampton begins her reading of Hobbes by explaining how rational 
individuals fail to cooperate in the state of nature. The key to her 
explanation is the short-sightedness of individuals: 
The account would contend that many people fail to 
appreciate the long-term benefits of cooperation and opt 
instead for the short-term benefits of non-cooperation, 
and the rest are legitimately fearful enough of this 
shortsightedness afflicting their partners to doubt that 
cooperation would have any educative effect. [Hampton 
1986, p. 811 
An important assumption here is that there are two types of individuals: 
the short-sighted and the non-short-sighted (hereafter called the prudent). 
An additional assumption is that there are long-term benefits of 
cooperation; that over a long period those who cooperate with their fellows 
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can expect to do better than those who do not. Hampton rests this 
assumption on the work of Robert Axel rod1 who argues that in some 
situations individuals who chose cooperative strategies did better than 
those who did not. Axelrod carefully noted, however, that cooperative 
strategies did worse in some environments than non-cooperative 
strategies. Thus, it cannot be expected that there will always be long term 
benefits to cooperation.2 An additional assumption is that the short-
sighted are not educable; they possess a fixed disposition for short-
sightedness. 
Two types of short-sightedness may afflict individuals. 
First, the iterated nature of the PD game might not be 
obvious to some of the less intellectually talented 
inhabitants of this state, who either never realize that 
they should take a multiplay perspective or are not 
mentally acute enough to work out the long-term 
benefits of cooperation. (Hampton 1986, p. 82P 
1 Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation. New York: Basic Books, 
1984. 
2 An example might help to clarify this point. Suppose that the world 
consists of four individuals, three of whom have adopted the strategy 
"Always Defect," and one who adopted the strategy "Tit for Tat" (cooperate 
on the first move and then do what the other individual did on the previous 
move). The three who chose "Always Defect" will do better than the one 
who chose 'Tit for Tat," for each of the three will be able to take advantage 
of the T i t for Tat" player before that individual responds with defection. 
Since the T i t for Tat" player can never get the others to cooperate and can 
never take advantage of them, s/he will never be able to make up for 
being taken advantage of on the first move. Someone who chose "Always 
Cooperate" in the same environment would fair even worse. 
3 Hampton's model for interaction in the state of nature is the 
Prisoner's Dilemma. The Prisoner's Dilemma is usually 
represented by a matrix of the form: 
B 
Cooperate Not Cooperate 
Cooperate (2£) 4,1) 
A 
Not Cooperate (1,4) 3,3) 
Payoffs here are given in rankings with 1 indicating the outcome most 
preferred by an individual (by convention, A's preferences are given first), 
and so on. No matter what B chooses, A does better by choosing not to 
cooperate, for 1 > 2 and 3 > 4. The same holds true for B. When Hampton 
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Let us call individuals who fail to recognize that they are in an iterated 
Prisoner's Dilemma the "cognitively short-sighted."4 
Second, and more important, even if it did occur to them 
that they might be in an iterated PD game in which 
substantial long-term benefits make cooperation 
rational, they might decide, nonetheless, to reject such a 
characterization of their situation on the grounds that the 
prospect of future contractual interactions with their 
present partners is too remote to warrant it. [Hampton 
1986, p. 82] 
Let us call those who so heavily discount the future as to turn the iterated 
Prisoner's Dilemma into a single play Prisoner's Dilemma the "affectively 
short-sighted." 
Both types of short-sighted individuals treat encounters in the state of 
nature as single play Prisoner's Dilemmas, and in such situations, the 
rational action is not to cooperate.5 If short-sighted individuals comprise 
the entire human population, the explanation for the origin of conflict 
would be straightforward. Hampton notes, however, that assuming the 
entire population consists of short-sighted individuals is unreasonable and 
that conflict will arise even if the population has both short-sighted and 
prudent individuals.6 
Even if the prudent recognize that humans in the state of nature are in 
an iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, the presence of the short-sighted forces 
them to choose not to cooperate. For, the prudent are conditional 
cooperators, cooperating only if they expect their partners to do so as well. 
If the prudent have no knowledge of the dispositions of their partners, and 
if the cost of exploitation is very high, then the prudent will be forced to 
choose non-cooperation out of self-defense. However, if several prudent 
individuals come to recognize one another as prudent, then there may be 
scattered pockets of cooperation. Provided that there are not too many 
pockets of cooperation, the fact that there are such pockets does not imply 
speaks of iteration, she has in mind the indefinite repetition of this choice 
situation for the same individuals. For a useful introduction to this 
problem see Richmond Campbell and Lanning Sowden, eds. Paradoxes of 
Rationality and Cooperation. Vancouver: The University of British 
Columbia Press, 1985. 
4 I owe this label and the equally useful "affectively short-sighted" to Ann 
Cudd. 
5 See footnote 4. 
6 See Hampton 1986, p. 81ff. 
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there is no need for a sovereign (though it may imply that hobbesians do 
not require the services of an absolute sovereign7). 
It has just been established that with the odd exception, hobbesians 
will choose not to cooperate with one another in the state of nature (shortly, 
we will examine the conditions under which cooperation is rational in 
greater detail). How, then, can they cooperate (contract) with one another 
to institute a sovereign? If their situation is that of the Prisoner's Dilemma, 
then there seems little hope that a sovereign will be instituted.8 
Fortunately, argues Hampton, this is not the situation faced by 
hobbesians: 
...the fact that people are continually in (what they are 
forced to regard as) single-play prisoner's dilemmas in 
the state of nature does not mean that they regard 
escaping this PD-prone situation as itself posing a 
prisoner's dilemma for them. [Hampton 1986, p. 148) 
Instead, of taking themselves to be in a Prisoner's Dilemma, 
Surrender 
Surrender (2^) 
A 
Do not Surrender (1,4) 
(figure 1) 
individuals take themselves to be in a coordination problem, 
Do not Surrender 
(4,1) 
(3,3) 
7 Hampton's book contains an interesting discussion of the problem of the 
absolute sovereign, which I will not be able to address in detail. The 
earliest commentators of Hobbes noted the peculiarity that hobbesians 
are to create an absolute sovereign while retaining a right to self-defense 
that is virtually boundless. Many have argued that the retention of this 
right undermines the authority of the absolute sovereign, thereby 
precluding her/his ability to lead the people out of the state of war. 
Hampton's response to this complaint is to argue that hobessians do not 
need an absolute sovereign; that Hobbes recognized this, and provided a 
description of an agency social contract as a fallback position. While I find 
Hampton's reading of Hobbes on this point interesting, it does not avoid 
the problems created by the introduction of the short-sighted. 
8 See footnote 4. 
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(figure 2) 
Figure 2 represents a situation where a sovereign has been chosen, and 
where A and B must decide whether to surrender to her or not. Since both 
A and B fear the combined might of the sovereign and the other (as 
indicated by the preferences for outcomes), each will find it rational to 
surrender to the sovereign. This will be true even for short-sighted 
individuals. 
All Hobbesians are interested in being sovereign: it offers each the 
best chance to secure her/his life. Yet, only one can be sovereign.9 
Determining who will be sovereign is a "Battle of the Sexes" 1 0 problem, 
argues Hampton: 
B 
A is Sovereign B is Sovereign 
A A is Sovereign (1,2) (3,3) 
B is Sovereign (3,3) (2,1) 
(figure 3) 
Initially, at least, each individual would prefer to be sovereign; if this is not 
possible, each would prefer that there were a sovereign rather than 
multiple sovereigns (in effect, no sovereign). Thus individuals find 
themselves in the situation depicted by figure 3. 
The problem is that there are two equilibria, (1,2) and (2,1). In order for 
individuals to coordinate their actions, they must be able to decide which 
of the two equilibria outcomes will be their goal. Hampton outlines several 
ways to accomplish this. 
First, one individual may be in a position to make side payments to 
the other e.g., A might promise B that the next time they are in a similar 
situation she will yield to his preferences. This method of breaking ties is 
not available to the short-sighted, however. The cognitively short-sighted 
will not perceive the advantage to be gained by making or receiving side 
payments since they are unable to look ahead to future encounters. The 
9 Hobbes did allow that the sovereign be a body of people, but he believed 
this to be inferior to the sovereignty of one. 
1 0 For a description of this game see R. Duncan Luce and Howard Raiffa, 
Games and Decisions. Mineola: Dover Publications, 1989 (reprint). 
B 
Surrender Do not Surrender 
A Surrender (1,1) (2,4) 
Do not Surrender (4,2) (3,3) 
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affectively short-sighted are not interested in the future and so will not be 
persuaded by the promise of future reward. 
Second, A and B might negotiate and by this process make one 
equilibrium salient by agreement. Setting aside the problem of choosing a 
bargaining theory, can short-sighted individuals perform the required 
negotiations? I do not believe that they can. Both individuals will have two 
options in each round of negotiations: to give in, or to hold out. The 
negotiations will be successful when one of them decides to give in, but it is 
unlikely that this will occur. The cognitively short-sighted will never be 
able to agree; they will always choose to hold out for they will not perceive 
that they are involved in anything other than a single-play game. The 
affectively short-sighted will not be interested in the future benefit to be 
gained by a negotiated outcome. It is likely that they will quickly loose 
interest in negotiation and walk away. 
Hampton recognizes that the cost of negotiation may be high; thus 
she suggests that individuals might instead choose a sovereign by 
successive balloting.11 In the first round, each individual will presumably 
vote for himself. In subsequent rounds, however, individuals will perform 
expected utility calculations, and shift their allegiance from themselves to 
the individual who is most likely to win. Eventually, one individual will 
receive most votes cast. The difficulty with choosing a sovereign by 
successive balloting is that the ability to perform expected utility 
calculations is a trait of the prudent. The cognitively short-sighted cannot 
be expected to change their vote, for they will not perceive that they are 
involved in a continuing process. The affectively short-sighted will not be 
interested in anything but the current round of voting, and thus are likely 
to alter their initial vote. It thus seems that the process of selecting a 
sovereign involves only the prudent. 
One final problem remains to be solved, that of empowerment. In 
order for the sovereign to enforce her orders she must have some 
instrument with which to enforce her will. For example, the sovereign 
needs individuals who are willing to capture dangerous criminals, police 
the streets, et cetera. All prefer that desperate criminals be apprehended, 
yet all also prefer not to face the risk associated with participating in their 
capture. Furthermore, each knows that even if he does not participate in 
the capture of the criminal provided that enough others do so, he will 
continue to share in the benefits accrued by having a dangerous criminal 
in jail. Since all share this preference and possess this knowledge, all are 
unlikely to willingly become members of the sovereign's punishment 
cadre. This problem is often called T h e Free Rider Problem." 
1 1 If a large number of voting rounds is required, it is difficult to see how 
voting is any less costly than negotiation. 
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If the Free Rider Problem is correctly modelled by the Prisoner's 
Dilemma 1 2 then it is unlikely that the sovereign will have a punishment 
cadre, and being unable to enforce her orders, will not be able to ensure 
that contracts are kept and the general peace secured. Fortunately, 
argues Hampton, the Free Rider Problem is not simply an n-person 
Prisoner's Dilemma. Hampton uses a careful examination of Hume's 
meadow draining example to make her case. Her key claim is that while 
Prisoner's Dilemmas have dominant actions, free-rider problems do not. 
This can be illustrated by a simplified version of Hume's meadow draining 
example. Consider the case of three individuals whose property adjoins a 
boggy meadow. All would benefit if the meadow were drained. If we 
suppose that only two need work together to drain the meadow, we can 
represent the choice situation facing one of them, A, thusly: 
Others 
N-2 Help N-l Help 
Help (5) (3) 
A 
Not Help (4) (4) 
(figure 4 ) 1 3 
Inspection reveals that there is no dominant strategy; individuals do not 
prefer no helping to helping under all circumstances. The key cases will 
be those where n-l of the persons needed to drain the meadow have 
agreed to do so. In these cases individuals my prefer helping to not 
helping. 
Putting aside the issue of whether Hampton correctly models the free-
rider problem, reveals for us what is the important question. Will short-
sighted individuals choose to help when placed in the game depicted in 
figure 4? Hampton suggests that the game is a three way battle of the 
sexes problem. As I argued earlier, however, it is unlikely either the 
cognitively short-sighted or the affectively short-sighted have the requisite 
talents to cooperate in such games. 
N-Help 
C) 
(1) 
1 2 See footnote 4 for the PD matrix. If "cooperate" is replaced with 
"Become a Cop," and "Not Cooperate" is replaced with "Don't Become a 
Cop," it is easy to see that individuals will not choose to become cops (join 
the punishment cadre). 
1 3 Payoffs here are given in rankings with 1 indicating an individual's most 
preferred outcome. It is assumed that individuals most prefer the 
outcome where the meadow is drained but they do not have to help, and 
least prefer that outcome where they attempt to drain the meadow with no 
assistance. See Hampton 1986, p. 178. 
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It would be tempting to conclude that Hobbesians are not able to 
choose a sovereign, or empower a sovereign, and thus that they are forever 
trapped in the war of all against all. But this would be premature, for 
Hampton would rightfully remind us that we have failed to consider the 
presence of the prudent. At first blush appeal to the prudent might seem 
to save Hampton's account. The prudent will have no problem developing 
a voting strategy, and will successfully empower a sovereign. Yet, 
Hampton cannot allow the entire population of the state of nature to be 
prudent, if it were, there would be no conflict and thus no need for a 
sovereign. What Hampton must do is to establish that there is some ratio 
of short-sighted to prudent such that there will be sufficient conflict to 
warrant the institution of a sovereign, yet sufficient cooperation to institute 
successfully the needed sovereign. 
Let us begin afresh by looking at the conditions under which the 
prudent will select non-cooperation over cooperation when in the state of 
nature. For illustrative purposes let us examine the encounter between 
two individuals in the state of nature. A, who is prudent (which I will 
indicate hereafter by "Ap"), and B who disposition is unknown to A. Ap 
wishes to discover whether the conditional expected utility (CEU) of 
cooperating (hereafter indicated by "C") is greater or less than the CEU of 
non-cooperation (hereafter indicated by "-C"). Ap, then, is interested in 
whether the CEU (C), which equals p(B ICJ/Ap IC))ul + p(B I-CJ/Ap [Cl)u2, 
is less or greater than the CEU (-Q, which is equal to p(B [CJ/Ap [-C])vl + 
p(B |-C)/Ap l-C])v2.M Where: 
ul = the cardinal utility to A if she and B cooperate 
u2 = the cardinal utility to A if she cooperates and B does not 
vl = the cardinal utility to A if she does not cooperate and B does 
v2 = the cardinal utility to A if she and B do not cooperate 
1 4 In words, we are interested in whether the conditional expected utility to 
A of choosing cooperation, which is equal to the probability that B will 
choose cooperation given that A chooses cooperation times the utility to A 
if both she and B choose cooperation, plus the probability that B will 
choose not to cooperate given that A chooses to cooperate times the utility 
to A if she cooperates and B does not, is greater or less than the 
conditional expected utility to A if choosing not to cooperate, which is 
equal to the probability that B chooses cooperation given that A chooses 
not to cooperate times the utility to A if she does not cooperate and B does 
cooperate, plus the probability that B chooses not to cooperate given that 
A chooses not to cooperate times the utility to A if neither she nor B 
cooperates. For a useful discussion of conditional probabilities, see 
Paradoxes of Rationality and Cooperation referenced in footnote 4. 
CRITICAL REVIEW 175 
Being prudent, Ap is disposed to cooperate when others cooperate with 
her, and not to cooperate when others do likewise. In addition Ap believes 
that the decision she and B make will be symmetrical; that the same 
factors that lead her to choose cooperation or non-cooperation will lead B 
to choose cooperation or non-cooperation. Thus, Ap is interested in 
comparing p(B [C]/Ap ICDul with p(B [-Cl/Ap 1-C])v2. When p(B l-CJ/Ap [-
C])v2 > p(B [C]/Ap (C])ul, Ap will choose not to cooperate. 
Since Ap bases her choice on what she expects B to do, we must find 
the circumstances under which B will cooperate and those under which he 
will not. If B is prudent, he will cooperate with Ap when he successfully 
recognizes her as prudent. Thus, p(B [CD = p(Bp and Br) = p(Bp)p(Br) = 
p(Bpr). 1 5 (Here, V stands for recognizing the disposition of the other and 
M-r" will indicate a failure to recognize the disposition of the other.) B will 
not cooperate with Ap when either he is short-sighted (which I will write 
"Bs") or when he fails to recognize Ap as prudent. Thus, p(B [-C]) = p(Bs or 
B-r) = p(Bs) + p(B-r). Making the appropriate replacements into p(B [-
C]/Ap (-C])v2 and p(B [CJ/Ap [C))ul, Ap is interested in comparing 
p(p(Br)/Ap[C])ul with p(p(Bs) + p(B-r)/Ap [-C])v2. In making this 
comparison we can remove from comparison what Ap would do by 
alternately setting p(Ap [C]) and p(Ap [-CD at 1. The relevant comparison, 
then, is between (p(Bp)p(Br))ul and (p(Bs) + p(B-r))v2. 
It quickly becomes apparent that p(Br) plays a critical role in 
determining the ratio of short-sighted to prudent necessary for Ap to 
choose non-cooperation over cooperation. Consider tables 1, 2, and 3. In 
table 1 p(Br) is equal to 3: 
p(Bp) x p(Br) x ul = 1 p(Bs) = p(B-r) x v2 = 1 C -C 
.1 5 3 .15 9 5 1 1.4 X 
2 5 3 30 JB 5 1 13 X 
3 5 3 .45 7 5 1 12 X 
A 5 3 .60 6 5 1 1.1 X 
5 5 3 .75 5 5 1 1.0 X 
6 5 3 SO .4 5 1 50 
7 5 3 1.05 3 5 1 £0 x 
(table 1) 
In table 2 p(Br) is equal to .6: 
p(Bp) x p(Br) x ul = 1 p (Bs) + p(B-r) x v2 = 1 C -C 
1 5 In words, the probability that B will choose to cooperate is equal to the 
probability that he is prudent and he recognizes A as prudent 
176 AUSLEGUNG 
.1 6 3 .18 9 A 1 13 X 
2 6 3 36 & A 1 12 X 
3 6 3 54 7 A 1 1.1 X 
A 6 3 .72 6 A 1 1.0 X 
5 6 3 90 5 A 1 90 
6 6 3 1.08 A A 1 JBO x 
(table 2) 
In table 3 p(Br) is equal to .7: 
p(Bp) x p(Br) x ul = 1 p(Bs) + p(B-4) x v2 = 1 C -C 
.1 7 3 21 9 3 1 12 X 
2 7 3 .42 B 3 2 1.1 X 
3 7 3 J63 7 3 1 1.0 X 
A 7 3 .84 6 3 1 9 X 
5 7 3 1D5 A 3 1 7 x 
(table 3) 
Note the effect of the increase in p(Br): as it increases the ratio of short-
sighted to prudent needed for -C to be chosen increases. 
If Hampton can provide a convincing argument at p(Br) is 3 or .6, 
then her reading of Hobbes is only subject to the difficulty that it provides 
for a sovereign by conquest. As we noted earlier, the short-sighted are not 
able to participate in the institution of a sovereign, though once a 
sovereign is instituted by the prudent, the short-sighted can be forced to 
surrender their natural liberty. In instances where p(Br) is 3 or .6, one 
would not expect the short-sighted to present much of a problem, for in 
these instances there need not be many short-sighted individuals for 
prudent individuals to choose non-cooperation over cooperation. The 
relatively large population of prudent individuals should have little trouble 
controlling the short-sighted. But, where p(Br) is greater than .6, an 
additional problem emerges for Hampton's reading of Hobbes. As p(Br) 
increases, prudent individuals will choose non-cooperation only when the 
short-sighted outnumber the prudent. The prudent will still recognize the 
value of a sovereign and will act together to institute one, but their ability 
to compel the short-sighted to join the commonwealth, as well as their 
ability to control them, will be impaired by their fewer numbers. 
There is reason to suspect that p(Br) will be high. First, if it is low ( 5 or 
.6) the large number of prudent individuals probably will form extensive 
pockets of cooperation, thus lessening the need for an absolute sovereign. 
In order, then, to have widespread conflict, the number of prudent 
individuals must be small, but this implies that p(Br) must be high. 
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Second, and more telling, it should be easy for the prudent to recognize 
the short-sighted: all they need do is devise a test that reveals the inability 
of the short-sighted to look beyond immediate gain. Again, this suggests 
that p(Br) will be high, and thus that the number of prudent individuals will 
be significantly smaller than the number of short-sighted individuals. This 
in turn suggests that on Hampton's reading Hobbesians cannot form a 
stable commonwealth. 
To sum up, self-interested individuals whose primary preference is for 
their reservation, transform the state of nature into the war of all against 
all. This same self-interest and preference leads them to renege on 
contracts, thus making the institution of an absolute sovereign by contract 
impossible. An absolute sovereign is necessary, however, for only an 
absolute sovereign, who has the power to enforce the laws of nature, allows 
individuals to escape the war of all against all. Although individuals will 
not willingly agree to institute a sovereign they can be compelled to do so 
by force. In a commonwealth by acquisition, the original preferences of 
individuals are overlain with new, threat induced preferences. While 
there is a continuous threat, the threat induced preferences will make it 
rational for individuals to abide by the laws of nature. The ability of the 
sovereign to project a continuous threat depends, however, on her ability 
to establish a viable punishment cadre. Yet individuals will not willingly 
become members of a punishment cadre for by doing so they place their 
lives at risk. Unless individuals are faced with a viable threat, they will not 
become members of a punishment cadre. Unfortunately the viable threat 
that would induce them to become members of a punishment cadre must 
itself be provided by a punishment cadre. Hobbesians, then, are unable to 
institute a sovereign by contract or be members of a stable commonwealth 
created by conquest. The self-interest and preference that doom the state 
of nature to perpetual war, forestalls the attempt of individuals to escape 
from it. To escape from the war of all against all, individuals must be able 
to complete contracts. Could they do this they would need no sovereign to 
enforce the laws of nature, which compel individuals to keep the contracts 
they have made. Thus, if Hobbesians need an absolute sovereign, they are 
unable to institute one; could they institute one, they would have no need 
of one. In brief, this is Hobbes's dilemma. 
In may view Hampton is attempting to steer between the two horns of 
Hobbes's dilemma. On the one hand, if the population of the state of 
nature consists only of short-sighted individuals, there will be conflict, but 
there can be no sovereign instituted by agreement. On the other hand, if 
the population of the state of nature consists entirely of prudent 
individuals, an agreement instituting a sovereign becomes possible, but 
there will be no conflict in the state of nature, and thus no need for a 
sovereign. Hampton attempts to find a middle ground by arguing that the 
population of the state of nature has both short-sighted and prudent 
individuals. If the proper ratio of short-sighted to prudent can be 
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determined, then the presence of the short-sighted will lead to conflict; 
and the presence of the prudent will lead to the institution of a sovereign. 
The problem with this middle ground is that the short-sighted are not party 
to the agreement that creates the sovereign; they become members of the 
commonwealth by force of arms, not by voluntary agreement. As unwilling 
participants in the commonwealth, they can be expected to disobey the 
sovereign whenever they believe they can get away with it. Their non-
compliance can only be contained if the sovereign's punishment cadre is 
large enough to present a viable threat, but this implies that the ratio of 
prudent individuals to short-sighted individuals is large. Given a larger 
ratio of prudent to short-sighted, however, the likelihood of conflict 
decreases and with it the likelihood that there is need for a sovereign. 
Thus, the dilemma which Hampton sought to avoid threatens to reappear. 
While I do not believe that Hampton's device of dividing hobbesians 
into the short-sighted and prudent avoids the problems latent in Hobbes's 
social contract theory, I did find her book valuable. Hampton's careful 
presentation of Hobbes provokes thoughtful response; her equally careful 
and thoughtful attempt to save as much of that theory as possible led me 
to take a long second look at the promise and limitations of social contract 
theory. 
